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Abstract
Sectoral contracts in many European countries set minimum wage floors for differ-
ent occupation groups. In addition, employers often pay an extra premium (a wage
cushion) to individual workers. We use administrative data from an annual census of
employees in Portugal, linked to collective bargaining agreements, to study the interac-
tions between wage floors and wage cushions and assess the impact of wage floors. We
show that wages exhibit a “spike” at the wage floor, but that a typical worker receives
a 20% premium over the floor, with wide variation across workers and firms. Flexibility
of cushions allows mean wages to respond to firm-specific productivity differences even
within the same sectoral agreement. New contract negotiations tend to raise all wage
floors proportionally, with increases that reflect average productivity growth among
covered firms. As floors rise, however, wage cushions are eroded, leading to an aver-
age passthrough rate of only about one-half. We also find no evidence of employment
responses to floor increases. Finally, we use a series of counterfactual simulations to
show that real wage reductions during the recent financial crisis were facilitated by
reductions in real wage floors (-2.2 ppts), reductions in real cushions (-2.5 ppts), and
the re-allocation of workers to lower wage floors (-4.8 ppts). Offsetting these effects
was a rapid rise in share of workers at higher education levels, which in the absence of
other factors would have led to rising real wages.
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How does collective bargaining affect wages? Much of the existing research on this issue
focuses on the U.S. (e.g., Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Lewis, 1986; Farber et al., 2020), where
union contracts set wages for jobs. In this setting an increase in negotiated wage rates trans-
lates directly to an increase in wages for workers who remain in the same job. Collective
bargaining agreements in many European countries work differently: these agreements spec-
ify a set of wage floors for different occupation groups. Employers can (and often do) pay
idiosyncratic wage premiums on top of the floors.1 These premiums – which Cardoso and
Portugal (2005) labeled “wage cushions” - partly undo the wage-standardizing features of
U.S.-style collective bargaining, contributing to within- and between-group pay inequality.2
Premiums can also adjust when floors change (or are frozen), providing a degree of wage
flexibility that is absent in the U.S. setting.3
In this paper we explore the relationship between collectively bargained wage floors and
actual wages in Portugal, using individual wage records linked to collective bargaining agree-
ments from 2008 to 2016. The Portuguese system of sectoral bargaining is broadly similar to
the systems in Spain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and France (see Schulten, 2016). More-
over, the prevalence of pay rates in excess of negotiated wage floors parallels the situation in
other countries. Thus, we believe there are general lessons to be drawn from a study of Por-
tugal. The setting is also interesting because as part of a 2011 debt relief package, a Troika
of international agencies pushed for changes in labor law to reduce sectoral bargaining.4
This effort largely failed. Nevertheless, as we will show, significant real wage adjustments
occurred within the framework of the existing bargaining system.
The key to our analysis is the ability to link individual workers in the annual census of
employees in Portugal – known as Quadros de Pessoal (QP) – to the collective bargaining
agreements (CBA) and wage floors that apply to their jobs. This is made possible by
1See Holden (1989, 1998) for the case of Norway; Calmfors and Nymoen (1990) for a broader discussion
of the Nordic countries; Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) and Jung and Schnabel (2009) for the case of Germany;
Ordine (1995) for Italy; Dolado et al. (1997) for Spain; Butter and Eppink (2003) for The Netherlands, and
Cardoso and Portugal (2005) and Bastos et al. (2009) for earlier analyses of Portugal.
2Freeman (1980) noted that the variance of wages is lower in the union sector than the non-union sector
and credited this in part to the elimination of idiosyncratic wage variation within jobs. Similarly, Ashenfelter
(1972) noted that unions raise wages of black workers relative to whites and suggested that this arose in
part because of standardization policies that reduce racial wage gaps within jobs. See Card, Lemieux and
Riddell (2004) for more discussion.
3This fact was recognized in the literature on “wage drift” – Phelps Brown (1962) presents an early,
informative analysis. See also Calmfors (1993).
4See Blanchard et al. (2013) for a discussion of the IMF’s recommendations, which appear to have been
adopted in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Portugal and the European
Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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two institutional facts. First, the QP identifies the CBA for each worker covered by a
union contract, as well as a job title that in principle specifies their wage floor. Second,
information on all newly negotiated CBA’s, including tables of wage floors for different
occupational groups, is published by the Ministry of Labor. Setting aside difficulties in
matching, it is therefore possible to assign wage floors to covered workers observed in the
QP in October of each year. While many previous studies have attempted to link subsets
of workers to their associated wage floors (e.g., Cardoso and Portugal (2005) for Portugal;
Card, Devicienti and Maida (2014) for Italy; Deelen and Euwals (2014) for Netherlands;
Diez-Catalan and Villanueva (2014) for Spain) we believe this is the most comprehensive
panel data set assembled to date that combines information on collectively bargained wage
floors and actual wages.
Two initial questions, highlighted by the goals of the Troika, are: How did the share of
workers covered by CBA’s change between 2008 and 2016? And how do uncovered workers
compare to covered workers? Consistent with other recent studies (e.g., Addison, Portugal,
and Vilares, 2017) we show that the fraction of full-time workers in QP covered by CBA’s
fell only slightly, from 90% in 2008 to 87% in 2016. We also show that uncovered workers
in Portugal earn higher wages than covered workers, contrary to the situation in countries
such as the U.S. or U.K. with establishment-based CBA’s.
After detailing our procedure for assigning wage floors, and comparing workers with and
without assigned floors, we present a descriptive analysis of the role of wage floors in between-
and within-group wage variation. We show that the log of an individual’s total monthly
wage can be decomposed into four components: (i) the minimum wage; (ii) the worker’s
relative wage floor (i.e. the floor relative to the minimum wage); (iii) the gap between
the base wage and the wage floor (i.e., the wage cushion); and (iv) regular supplementary
payments (including meal subsidies and shift premiums).5 As was documented by Cardoso
and Portugal (2005) using QP data for 1999, we find that differences in relative wage floors
and differences in mean wage cushions both contribute to inter-group wage differences. For
example, about 30% of the wage gap between men and women is attributable to higher wage
floors for men, and 60% to higher mean wage cushions for men. We also show that wage
inequality within skill groups reflects variation in both wage floors and wage cushions, as
well as the covariance between them.
Within a given sectoral agreement firms have some latitude in assigning workers to differ-
5Meal allowances are widespread in Portugal, in part because they are tax exempt up to a fairly generous
level (currently up to 7.63 Euros per day).
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ent floor categories, and even more latitude in determining wage cushions. Both dimensions
contribute to the cross-sectional variation in wages within CBA’s. Classifying firms into
deciles of average value added per worker, we show that mean base wages at top decile firms
are over 40 log points higher than mean base wages at bottom decile firms in the same sec-
toral agreement. Around 10% of this effect is attributable to higher wage floors for workers
at top decile firms, while 90% is attributable to higher wage cushions. Thus, wage cushions
play a particularly large role in within-CBA wage flexibility.
Next, we study the renegotiation process for wage floors in different CBA’s. We show
that virtually all floors adjust by the same percentage when a CBA is renegotiated. We
then relate the percentage change in floors in a renegotiated contract to measures of the
distribution of productivity growth among firms covered by the contract. We focus on two
closely related questions: (1) Are wage outcomes driven by average productivity growth of
covered firms, or by conditions at high- or low-performers within the covered set? (2) How
sensitive are negotiated wage floors to productivity growth of covered firms? We find that
negotiations respond to mean (or median) growth in value added per worker among covered
firms (rather than to upper- or lower-tail growth), with an elasticity of around 0.10 - as big
or bigger than the typical elasticities estimated in the micro rent sharing literature (see Card
et al., 2018).
The impact of changes in wage floors depends on how wage cushions adjust as floors are
changed. If employers raise wages to maintain cushions – as is implicitly assumed in some
analyses of CBA’s – then negotiated wage floor increases will pass through fully to actual
wages. If cushions are compressed as floors rise, however, the passthrough rate will be lower.
To estimate passthrough rates we construct the change in base wages that would occur if
each worker maintained the same gap between their wage and the wage floor as floors are
changed. We then regress actual wage increases on these simulated increases, using both
OLS and an instrumental variables approach that takes the average simulated increase in
wages for all workers at the same firm as an instrument for the worker-specific effect of
the floor increase. We find that the average passthrough rate of floor increases is around
50%, with higher rates for workers with smaller wage cushions and lower rates for workers
with the highest cushions. This pattern is similar to the spillover effect of a minimum wage
increase (e.g., Cengiz et al., 2019; Fortin, Lemieux and Lloyd, forthcoming), though the
impact of wage floor increases extends further up the distribution. We also test for but
find no evidence of asymmetry of responses to real floor increases arising from new contract
negotiations versus those attributable to inflation.
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Although our main focus is on how wage floors affect wages, we also examine effects
on employment. Specifically, using the same instrumental variable we use to study the
passthrough of floors to individual wages, we relate firm-wide employment changes to the
simulated increase in base wages of its employees caused by changes in wage floors. Our
estimates suggest that employment is unaffected by higher wage floors, though we cannot
reject small negative impacts.
In the final section of the paper we conduct a simulation analysis to understand how
changes in wage floors and wage cushions, as well as movements of workers between jobs
with different wage floor categories, contributed to the adjustment of real wages between 2010
and 2016, as Portugal suffered through a prolonged recession. We begin by computing mean
real wages for workers in different gender-education-age groups in 2010. We then increment
the wage floors to incorporate renegotiations between 2010 and 2016, but keep each worker in
the same floor category, and hold constant their wage cushions and supplementary payments.
The comparison between this counterfactual and the 2010 baseline summarizes the net effect
of wage floor adjustments, and shows a 2.5 ppt reduction in average real wages attributable
to the erosion in real floors over the 6 years. Next, we reweight skill groups in 2010 to their
2016 shares to measure the effects of demographic change. Driven by a rapid rise in shares
of better-educated workers, this yields a 7.4 ppt increase in mean real wages in the economy
as a whole that would have occurred if wage floors, wage cushions, and the assignment of
workers to floors had remained constant.
We then consider a counterfactual based on workers observed in 2016, using their actual
wage floors as of 2016 but simulating the wage cushion each worker would have earned in 2010
(by drawing from the distribution of cushions in 2010). Relative to the previous simulation,
this counterfactual reveals the net effect of the reallocation of workers across wage floor
groups that occurred between 2010 and 2016, and yields a 4.8 ppt reduction in mean real
wages for workers as a whole. Finally, we give each worker their actual wage cushion in 2016
(rather than a simulated 2010 wage cushion). This final step shows that changes in wage
cushions within wage floor categories led to a further 2.5 ppt reduction in mean real wages.
Despite concerns that sectoral bargaining limits the responsiveness of real wages to neg-
ative shocks, our simulations suggest that real wages fell substantially during the debt crisis.
The declines were particularly large for university-educated workers, whose mean real wages
fell by 16 ppt between 2010 and 2016, reflecting a combination of declining real wage floors
(-4.4 ppt), declining real cushions (-6.2 ppt), and a reallocation of jobs toward lower wage
floor categories (-8.4 ppt). Real wage cuts for lower-paid workers were smaller: young high
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school-educated females and males, for example, experienced declines of 4.8 ppt and 5.6 ppt,
respectively.
Our findings contribute to three separate strands of research. First, we contribute to a
macro-oriented literature that compares different collective bargaining systems (e.g., Calm-
fors and Driffill, 1988; Calmfors, 1993; Nickell and Layard, 1999). This literature implicitly
assumes that sectoral agreements set wages for covered firms, ignoring employer-determined
wage cushions – a simplification that overstates the rigidity of Portuguese wage setting.
Second, we contribute to the micro-oriented literature linking union-wage setting to wage
inequality (Freeman, 1980; Card, 1992; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Farber et al.,
2020). Building on Cardoso and Portugal (2005), we show that in a European setting, id-
iosyncratic wage premiums are important determinants of within-group and between-group
inequality. The size and distribution of these premiums helps explain why, despite very
high CBA coverage rates, Portugal also has relatively high wage inequality. Finally, we con-
tribute to the “micro Phillips curve” literature (e.g., Riddell, 1979; Card, 1990; Christofides
and Oswald, 1992) that examines the determinants of negotiated wage outcomes using union
contract data. The combination of data on individual workers, firms, and collective agree-
ments allows us to examine the full set of wage floors within a contract (rather than just the
“base wage” for lower skilled workers), to test how multi-employer agreements are impacted
by the distribution of firm-specific productivity growth among covered firms, and to relate
collectively bargained wage floors to individual wage outcomes.
1 Setting and Conceptual Framework
Sectoral Bargaining in Portugal and Reforms During the Debt Crisis
Under the system established in Portugal in the 1970s and still in place in 2010, employers’
associations representing firms in a particular industry (and in some cases region) would
sign CBA’s with one or more trade unions.6 Although these agreements technically cover
only union members, in practice employers routinely extended the agreements to their entire
workforce, regardless of membership status. In most instances the bargaining parties would
then file a request with the Directorate-General for Employment and Labor Relations to
extend the agreement to other firms in the same sector - a request that was normally granted
6There are two main union confederations in Portugal - the União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT) and the
more radical Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTP). Often an employer association
will have separate agreements with affiliates of both confederations, but the terms will be identical. In our
analysis below we treat such parallel agreements as a single CBA.
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(see Naumann, 2018). Contract provisions could also be voluntarily adopted by employers
in the industry.
Each CBA contains a variety of clauses prescribing work rules and practices, as well as a
set of wage floors that prevail during the term of the contract. Figure 1 presents an example
of the table of wage floors from a typical agreement – in this case a 2016 agreement between
the Association of Hotel and Restaurant Employers and the Union of Service Workers. This
wage table distinguishes between two subgroups of employers (groups A and B) and 12
different wage floors, ranging from 440 to 960 Euros per month.7
Collectively bargained wage clauses almost always have a nominal duration of one year.
In case a new agreement has not been negotiated, however, the old agreement remains in
force, and in the early years of our sample (2008-2009) a typical new agreement was updating
a contract that was negotiated about two years earlier (see Section 2.1, below). Prior to 2003
the Labor Code required that any new agreement be at least as favorable to workers as the
old agreement and also prevented firms from withdrawing from a CBA. These rules were
relaxed by amendments in 2003 and 2009 that allowed new agreements to loosen work rules
and lower wage floors. The 2003 and 2009 amendments also created a process for CBA’s to
expire, though procedures governing the granting of extensions were unchanged.8
At the peak of the financial crises in 2011, the Portuguese government signed a memo-
randum of understanding (MOU) with the European Commission (EC), European Central
Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) – the Troika – committing to a wide
range of policy reforms, including revisions of the contract extension framework that were
intended to reduce the coverage of sectoral agreements and encourage firm-level bargaining.9
7These are monthly salaries for full time workers, net of payroll taxes – by law workers receive 14 monthly
salaries. As of 2016 (for which the floors apply) the minimum wage was 530 Euros, so group III has a floor
at the national minimum wage. The two bottom groups are apprentices, who face a minimum of 80% of the
regular minimum wage.
8The number of collective bargaining agreements that were determined to have expired under these rules
is low: a total of 15 expiration notices were published in 2009; and over the period from 2010 to 2016 another
17 expiration notices were published (Portugal, CRL, 2020: 58; Portugal, MTSS, 2016: 374). The number of
agreements that actually expired may have been somewhat different because of subsequent Court decisions.
9A key issue for the Troika was that sectoral contracts could only be extended if the employer association
represented a relatively high fraction of employers in the sector. The underlying idea seemed to be that in
the absence of extensions, uncovered firms would negotiate individually with works councils (see European
Commission, 2011, p. 52). A practical problem with this idea is that although works councils are legally
recognized in Portugal, they are relatively rare. Indeed, a study by the Ministry of Labor (MTSS 2006)
found less than 200 works councils in the whole country. In addition, most employers in Portugal are small
and have limited capacity for collective bargaining on their own. Finally, the Portuguese Constitution gives
unions the exclusive right to bargain for workers, creating a potential legal obstacle to bargaining by works
councils.
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Ultimately these reforms ran into legal challenges, as well as opposition from employer asso-
ciations, many of which supported the existing extension framework (see Naumann, 2018).
After Portugal exited the financial aid program in 2014, the new center-left government
adopted a series of revisions that more or less restored the pre-crisis bargaining framework.
Wage Setting Under Sectoral Bargaining
The wage floors in Portuguese CBA’s set a lower bound on basic pay for workers in each
occupational category. As in other European countries, however, firms can and do offer many
workers a wage that is higher than the minimum for their category. This differs from the
typical situation in the U.S. (or in Canada and the U.K.), where a union contract specifies
a grid of wages for different jobs, and all workers in the same job receive the same pay – a
wage standardizing property that is arguably a defining feature of unionized wage setting
in a U.S.-style system (Ashenfelter, 1972; Freeman, 1980). In addition, most workers in
Portugal receive regular “supplementary” payments, including tax free meal subsidies, that
are the same from month to month and may be impacted by collective negotiations.
To clarify the role of these various components, let Wit represent the net monthly base
wage for worker i in year t and let Fi,t represent the wage floor that applies to that worker.
Let Hit = Wit − Fit represent the absolute gap between the base wage and the wage floor,
and let Sit represent the regular monthly supplemental payments received by worker i in year
t.10 Then we can decompose the base monthly wage and the corresponding total monthly
wage (W Tit ):
Wit = Fit +Hit
W Tit = Fit +Hit + Sit
For most of our analysis below we work with logarithms of wages rather than levels.
Letting wit ≡ lnWit represent the log of the monthly base wage, and wTit ≡ lnW Tit represent
the log of the monthly total wage, we can write:
wTit = fit + hit + sit (1)
10In Portugal (as elsewhere in Continental Europe) wages are normally expressed as monthly full-time
rates, net of any employee payroll taxes. Wage floors in CBA’s and the national minimum wage are similarly
expressed. Moreover, workers receive 14 monthly salaries per year.
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represents his or her regular supplementary payments, expressed as a share of the base wage.
In the presence of a national minimum wage, it is helpful to decompose the log wage floor
into the sum of the log of the minimum wage (mt ≡ lnMt) and the gap between the floor
and the minimum wage:






Substituting into equation (1) we get a simple four component model of log wages:
wTit = mt + rfit + hit + sit (2)
that expresses the log total wage for individual i in year t as the sum of the minimum wage,
the relative wage floor for the worker’s job, her wage cushion, and her regular supplementary
payments. This additive structure is very convenient for decomposing the variance of the log
of total wages (see Section 3, below), for addressing the causal question of how actual wages
respond to adjustments in wage floors (see section 5), and for considering counterfactual
scenarios, such as one in which floors are raised and all wage cushions remain constant, so
each worker maintains a fixed (proportional) pay premium over his or her floor (see Section
7).
2 Assigning Wage Floors to Workers
In this section we describe our data base of workers with assigned wage floors. We begin
with an overview of our data base of CBA’s. We then discuss the Quadros de Pessoal (QP)
and our procedure for assigning wage floors to workers in QP.
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2.1 Data on Collective Agreements – BTE
All newly negotiated CBA’s in Portugal are published in the Labor Bulletin (Boletim do
Trabalho e Emprego, BTE) and are available in an online archive (http://bte.gep.msess.
gov.pt). We began our data assembly process by extracting information for agreements
published between 2008 to 2016 that included a salary clause or wage table. For each
agreement we extracted:
• the names of the union(s), employer association(s) and other information that formally
identifies the contract
• the type of agreement (sectoral agreement, company agreement, multi-company agree-
ment, government directive)11
• the starting date; expiration date; and reference information on the preceding agree-
ment
We also collected information on the categories and wage floors in the wage tables. The
system for designating floor categories varies widely across contracts but in most cases we
are able to construct a list of job titles/occupations included in the category - often by
examining previous versions of the same contract that provided more detail. Fortunately,
the classification system usually evolves slowly over time, making it possible to construct a
panel of floors for each CBA and floor group.
There are a few complications in constructing an accurate panel of wage floors. One
is that wage floor increases are sometimes back-dated (reflecting delays in renegotiating a
contract). Since our interest is in the effect of wage floors on the current (flow) cost of labor,
we attempt to measure the prevailing wage floor as of October of each year (the reference
date of the QP survey), ignoring retrospective increases and associated back-payments to
workers. A second issue is that an increase in the national minimum wage can over-ride
the wage floor for lower-paid workers, particularly if the contract has not been renegotiated
recently. In accordance with the labor law we update all wage floors to meet the minimum
wage as of the reference date of the QP. A third complication is that some agreements (such
as the one underlying the wage table in Figure 1) specify separate wage floors for subgroups
of firms (e.g., based on revenues), or workers (e.g., based on tenure). We keep track of the
11Multi-company agreements (acordo coletivo) are legally distinct from sectoral agreements (contrato co-
letivo) and are particularly common in the finance and utility sectors. Government directives are mandated
agreements imposed in the absence of any other collective agreement (portaria de condições de trabalho) or
in case of an unresolved dispute (decisão arbitral).
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subgroup classification system and attempt to assign the correct floor to a worker, though
that is not always possible.
A final issue is that in many cases an employer or employer association will sign separate
but essentially identical agreements with different unions (typically, one affiliated with UGT
and another affiliated with CGTP). We consolidate such duplicate agreements, reducing the
total number of agreements over the 2008-2016 period from 1,467 to 1,061 (See Appendix A
and Appendix Table A1). We also drop agreements covering firms in agriculture or fisheries
or those in Madeira or the Azores. We are left with 988 new consolidated agreements that
form our basic CBA data set. Around 50% of these are sector-wide contracts, just over 10%
are multi-company contracts, and the remaining 38% are CBA’s covering a single firm (see
Appendix Tables A2 and A3).
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the number of unduplicated new agreements in our basic
CBA data set by year of renegotiation, while column 2 shows the share of those agreements
that were sectoral CBA’s.12 Close to 200 (consolidated) agreements were reached in 2008.
The number then began to fall off, reflecting the tendency for renegotiations to slow down
in the face of worsening economic conditions. In 2012 and 2013 the number was particularly
low, driven by the severe recession and uncertainty over collective bargaining institutions in
the aftermath of the MOU with the Troika. Following the nascent recovery and legislative
changes in 2014 that re-established the framework for contract extensions, the number of
new agreements rose to around 90 per year in 2014-2016.
Although nearly all collective bargaining agreements in Portugal (97% in our sample) have
a nominal one-year duration, an existing CBA remains in force until a new one is negotiated
(or in very rare cases when an employer exits the agreement). As shown in column 3 of Table
1, in 2008 the mean elapsed time since the publication date of the previous agreement was 20
months – implying a delay of about 8 months between the expiration of the old contract and
the publication date of the new one. By 2015 the time since last agreement had risen to 37
months, implying a delay of over 2 years between the expiration date and the renegotiation
date. The increase in delay time was particularly pronounced for sectoral contracts, driven
by the near-collapse in renegotiation of these agreements in 2012 and 2013. As a consequence
of these long delays, by 2014 many workers were covered by floors that were 2-3 years old,
a situation that was only partly remedied by the upswing in negotiations in 2015 and 2016.
12We emphasize that the numbers of agreements shown represent counts after consolidating duplicated
agreements. The numbers of agreements prior to this adjustment are shown in Appendix Table 3. A typical
sectoral agreement covers firms in multiple regions: weighting by employment, 86% of sectoral agreements
include workers in all 5 NUTS2 regions of Portugal.
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2.2 Quadros de Pessoal
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) is an annual census of employers conducted by the Ministry of
Employment. Firms that employ at least one wage earner are required to report a variety of
information to the Ministry, including some financial information (such as total annual sales)
and data on a full roster of employees as of the reference week in October. In a law dating
back to the 1970s employers are also required to post this roster (with names, job titles and
monthly pay) inside their premises, providing a remarkable level of pay transparency and
reducing the likelihood of misreporting or under-reporting. The Ministry makes available
an electronic version of the data set that has longitudinal identifiers for each firm and each
worker. We use QP data for the period from 2008 to 2016.
The variables reported for each worker include gender, age, education, occupation, date
of hire, nationality, monthly earnings (split into several components), hours of work (normal
and overtime), as well as the collective agreement that the worker is covered by (if any).
Unfortunately, the QP does not report the actual wage floor for the worker or the name of
the floor category as used in the BTE. Instead, it reports a job title or professional category
of the worker, which in many cases can be matched to the list of job titles or occupations
reported for the floor categories in BTE.
In addition to the information collected by the QP itself, we also have access to matched
income statement/balance sheet information for most employers.13
Starting from the universe of observations in QP we exclude workers under the age of 18
or over 64, those in Madeira and the Azores, and those employed in agriculture and fisheries.
(See Appendix A). We also exclude apprentices (3.5% of the relevant sample), workers who
are not employed full time (15.1%), and those with missing information on wages (8.9%,
including unpaid family members and owners of firms) or education or date of hire (0.1%).
Columns 4-6 of Table 1 report the resulting number of workers in our QP sample each year,
the fraction that are reported by their employer as covered by a CBA, and the fraction
covered by sectoral agreements. On average we have about 1.85 million workers per year,
with a dip during the most severe recessionary years and a partial recovery by 2016. The
collective bargaining coverage rate starts at 90% in 2008, remains relatively steady until
2011, then declines slightly each year thereafter, ending at 87%. On average 81% of covered
workers are covered by a sectoral agreement, a fraction that fell slightly over our sample
13The Integrated Business Accounts System - IBAS (Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas - SCIE)
covers the non-financial business sector. It is compiled by the National Statistical Office, who is also respon-
sible for the linking to QP and dissemination for research purposes, under an anonymized data format.
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period, from 83% to 80%.
In Appendix B we use a simple accounting model to decompose the year-to-year changes
in collective bargaining coverage in our QP sample, focusing on the effects of worker-level
transitions between three states: employed and covered by a CBA, employed and not covered
by a CBA, and not employed (i.e., not included in QP in a given year). This analysis shows
no evidence of major changes in the probability that people retain their coverage status, or
in transition into or out of jobs covered by a CBA, over our sample period (see Appendix
Table B1). There was a slowdown in the probability that people entered the workforce in
2011-2014, and a slight reduction in the fraction of these new entrants that moved into a job
covered by a CBA. Together these factors account for most of the (relatively modest) losses
in coverage after 2011.
2.3 Assigning Wage Floors to Workers in QP
To assign wage floors from BTE to workers in QP we proceeded in two steps. We first
matched contracts in QP to those in our BTE database. This process was conducted sep-
arately for each year, as some agreements split over time.We then attempted to match the
wage floor groups within a contract in BTE to the job category codes reported in QP.
The matching of contracts was done by hand, since the agreement names used in BTE
and QP often differ significantly, with more frequent updating of the names in the BTE
(reflecting changes in the bargaining parties and other factors). We followed a series of
protocols to match contracts over time and between the two databases, including: inspection
of the text of each agreement; construction of consistent longitudinal information on the
renegotiation dates of each agreement and on the reported numbers of covered workers and
firms; inspection of longitudinal information on workers in QP to identify the most frequent
transitions between agreements; searches on the web pages of trade unions or employer
associations; and telephone or email contacts with trade unions.
Matching of the wage floors in BTE to the worker categories in QP was more difficult.
We began by inspecting the text of each agreement in BTE to find a list of all jobs/job
titles in each floor group.14 Next, we matched the BTE floor groups in a given CBA to the
QP worker categories for the same CBA, again by direct inspection of the possible m → n
matches for each CBA. In agreements setting different wage floors for workers depending on
their date of hire, tenure, or skill, we attempted to use information in QP to assign workers
14We often had to track past agreements to find the full list of job titles in each floor group because in
some cases – such as that shown in Figure 1 – only a group code is reported.
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to the correct wage floors. Likewise, whenever the applicable wage floor depended on firm
attributes reported in QP, such as the firm’s industry or employment, we matched the worker
category in QP to its wage floor accordingly. Appendix A provides further details on the
process of matching.
Despite our best efforts we were only able to match about half of all workers in QP
covered by a CBA to their wage floor (see Appendix Table A2). The main obstacles were (1)
lack of information on the variables needed to assign workers to specific floors within a CBA;
(2) too many sub-floors for each occupational category; (3) lack of obvious matches between
the occupations or job types specified in BTE and the job titles used in QP. Columns 7-9
of Table 1 present some information on the subset of workers in QP that were successfully
assigned a floor. The fraction of matched workers rises from 32% in 2008 to 44% in 2010
and is more or less stable thereafter. The lower rate at the start of our sample is due to
the fact that many workers in QP in October 2008 or 2009 were covered by floors that were
last renegotiated in 2006 or 2007, prior to the start of our BTE database. By the time of
the 2010 QP most workers in QP were covered by an agreement that was updated between
January 2008 and September 2010. We note that in a typical year after 2010 our matched
database includes about 2,500 separate wage floors.15
2.4 Comparisons of Workers by Coverage and Floor Assignment
Status
Before proceeding with an analysis based on the subset of workers with matched floors we
examine two questions: How do covered workers with a matched floor compare to those for
whom we were unable to assign a floor? And how do workers who are uncovered by CBA’s
compare to covered workers?
Table 2 presents some simple data that address these questions: we show characteristics
and wage outcomes for all workers, for those who are covered and uncovered by a CBA, and
for covered workers with and without a matched wage floor. Focusing first on the data in
columns 4 and 5, we conclude that covered workers who can be assigned a wage floor are
broadly similar to those who cannot. In particular their gender, education, experience, job
tenure and mean log wages are quite similar. Importantly, this similarity is also true year-
15Martins (2021) claims that there are 30,000 minimum wage floors in Portugal. His analysis counts all job
categories within the CBA’s identified in QP, without taking into account the duplication of CBA’s or the
fact that a typical wage floor group in BTE actually incorporates roughly 4 job categories in QP. Together
these corrections imply that there are only about 5,000 separate wage floors at any point in time, roughly
half of which we are able to match to a wage floor published in BTE.
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by-year (see Appendix Table C1), suggesting that we can draw broader conclusions from an
analysis of data for workers with assigned wage floors.
On the other hand, comparisons between columns 2 and 3 show that workers with and
without CBA coverage are substantially different. Uncovered workers are two times more
likely to have a university-level education (38% versus about 17% for covered workers), have
somewhat fewer years of experience and job tenure than covered workers, and have about
20% higher wages. The wage advantage of uncovered workers is not only a result of their
higher education: controlling for gender, education, experience, and 1-digit industry effects,
a simple wage model shows a 10% wage premium for uncovered workers. Not surprisingly,
perhaps, wages are also more variable among uncovered workers, with σ(wTit) about 12%
higher than for covered workers.
An examination of coverage patterns within firms reveals that nearly all firms either
have no covered workers or 100% union coverage. Firms with no coverage tend to be larger
than covered firms (mean employment = 8.4 workers versus 6.1 for covered firms), and have
substantially higher annual sales per worker (˜74,800 versus ˜39,900 for covered firms). They
are also more likely to be located in Lisbon and to be in the non-financial services sector
(42% versus 20% for uncovered firms).
The positive wage advantage for uncovered workers in Portugal stands in sharp contrast
to the pattern that exist in the US, Canada or the UK. In these countries union coverage
tends to be positively correlated with wages. For example, data presented by Card, Lemieux
and Riddell (2004) show that the difference in mean log hourly wages between workers who
are covered by collective agreements and those who are not is between 15 and 30 percent
in all three countries (and between 5 and 25 percent controlling for gender, education, and
experience).
3 Proximate Analysis of the Components of Wages
We now turn to a descriptive analysis of the role of the wage floors, wage cushions, and
supplementary payments in determining wage differentials between groups and overall wage
inequality. For this analysis (and all analysis in the remainder of the paper) we focus on the
sample of person-year observations in QP with assigned wage floors, described in columns
7-9 of Table 1.
Figure 2 shows the distributions of relative wage floors and wage cushions by gender,
pooling across all years of our sample. Panel a shows that many wage floors (especially for
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female workers) are within about 5 percentage points of the minimum wage, though there
is a long upper tail of floors. In contrast, the distributions of cushions in panel b are more
bell-shaped, with modest spikes in the range of 0-5% (affecting about 4 percent of workers),
modes at around 20-25 percent, and relatively long upper tails.
Figure 3 shows how the mean values of the three individual-specific components of wages
highlighted in equation (2) vary over time for different groups of workers. Figure 3a presents
mean relative floors, cushions, and supplements by gender; Figure 3b present similar data
by education level; and Figure 3c presents mean floors and cushions for workers employed
at firms in different quartiles of the distribution of value added per worker. Finally, Figure
3d shows the mean values of wage floors, cushions, and supplements by age for female and
male workers (pooling across all years in our sample).
Examination of Figures 3a-3c shows that across most subgroups, mean relative wage
floors fell during our sample period. This decline reflects a combination of declining real
wage floors within a given CBA and the re-allocation of workers to jobs with lower wage
floors - a combination that we decompose below. In contrast the mean values of cushions and
supplements are more stable, though there are clear declines in mean cushions for workers
with higher levels of education, particularly university education. Figure 3c also shows that
mean floors and cushions declined for workers at firms in the top quartile of value added per
worker, leading to some compression of between-firm wage differentials (the opposite of the
pattern observed in Germany and the U.S.)
The age profiles in Figure 3d reveal that young workers tend to be employed in jobs with
very low wage floors, and to receive small wage cushions. By age 25 or so, however, mean
floors are in the 15 percent range and mean wage cushions are 5-8 percentage points, and by
age 40 a typical female has a wage floor of around 25 log points and a cushion of 15 points,
while a typical male has a wage floor of nearly 30 points and a cushion of over 25 points.
Thus, both floors and cushions contribute to the well-known life cycle profile of wages.
Table 3 presents a simple summary of the net contributions of relative wage floors, cush-
ions, and supplements to the levels and variances of wages, for all workers and by gender,
education, and firm value-added quartile. The first 5 columns decompose the means of log
salary, while columns 6-10 pertain to variances. In the first row, for example, we show the
mean log real monthly wage for all workers, the mean wage differential relative to the mini-
mum wage (61 log points), and the mean contribution of relative wage floors (24 log points),
wage cushions (19 log points) and supplements (17 log points). As shown by the numbers
in parentheses just below the row entries, these three terms contribute 40.2%, 31.4% and
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28.4%, respectively, to the mean log gap between monthly salaries and the minimum wage.
For the decomposition of variances we show var[rfit], var[hit], var[sit], and 2cov[rfit, hit]
(2 times the covariance of relative floors and wage cushions) which is typically the largest
of the covariance terms arising from a decomposition of var[wit] based on equation (2). For
the workforce as a whole, relative floors contribute 32.3% of the overall variance in log total
salaries, cushions contribute 42.1%, supplements contribute 9.1%, and the positive covariance
of floors and cushions across workers contributes 15.6%. Together these 4 terms account for
99.2% of the total variance.
The next set of rows in Table 3 show a parallel set of statistics for males, females, and
for the gender gaps in mean log wages and in the variance of wages. Males have higher and
more variable wages than females, differences that are attributable to the both higher and
more variable floors (30% of the gender gap in mean wages, 22% of the gap in variance of
wages) and to higher and more variable cushions (60% of the gender gap in mean wages,
75% of the gap in variance of wages). Similar conclusions apply to the wages of more versus
less educated workers. For example, 58% of the 27 log point gap in mean wages between
high school graduates and those with less than a high school education is attributable to
higher floors, while 31% is attributable to higher cushions.
As shown in the bottom three rows of the table, differences in mean wage cushions also
play a significant role in explaining the mean wage gap between firms in the top and bottom
quartile of value added per worker: just over one-half of the 68 log point gap in mean
wages is explained by higher average cushions at more productive firms. This suggests that
differences in the size of wage cushions are affected in part by firms’ ability to pay, consistent
with models of firm-specific wage setting (e.g., Card et al., 2018).
To investigate this more fully we conducted a simple analysis of wage floors, wage cush-
ions, and log base wages, controlling for the specific CBA covering each worker. Specifically
we fit models of the form:
yit = α0 + αxXit +
10∑
d=2
αdId(i,t) + ψCBA(i,t) + uit (3)
where yit represents either the wage floor, wage cushion, or log base wage of worker i in
year t, Xit is a set of worker characteristics (gender, education and age), d(i, t) is an index
function that maps the worker to the value-added deciles of his/her employer in year t, Id is
a dummy for the dth decile of value added, CBA(i, t) is another index function that maps
the worker to the specific collective bargaining agreement he or she is covered by in year t
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, and ψC represent a set of CBA fixed effects. The results are presented in Table 4. For
reference we show models for the 3 outcomes with and without CBA effects. A comparison
of the estimated αx and αd coefficients in these models allows us to assess how much of the
overall variation in each outcome across workers and firms is preserved even within collective
agreements.
The wage floor models in Table 4 summarize the assignment process between workers,
firms, and floors in the labor market as whole (column 1) and within CBA’s (column 2). The
coefficients of the worker-specific characteristics in the upper panel of the table suggest that
women are assigned to lower floors, while better-educated and older workers are assigned
to higher floors: these matching effects are only somewhat attenuated within CBA’s. The
coefficients in the lower panel show that wage floors are higher at firms with higher value
added per worker. Unlike the pattern for worker characterstics, however, the cross-firm
gradient in floors is substantially flatter within CBA’s than in the market as a whole. As
emphasized by Boeri et al. (2020), this could be a cause for concern if less profitable firms
are covered by collective agreements with relatively high floors.
The wage cushion models in columns 3 and 4 suggest that mean cushions vary across
gender, education and age groups more or less the same within CBA’s as they do in the
labor market as a whole. In contrast, mean cushions are more responsive to firm profitability
within CBA’s, partly undoing the relatively flattening of differences in wage floors within
agreements. As a consequence, about 85% of the variation in mean base wages across firm
value added deciles represented by the coefficients in column 5 is preserved within CBA’s.16
In other words, sectoral agreements appear to only modestly dampen the sensitivity of wages
to firm profitability.
The importance of cushions as a source of flexibility is summarized in columns 7 and 8.
Since the base wage is just the sum of the wage floor and the wage cushion, we can calculate
the share of the α coefficients reported in columns 5 and 6 that is attributable to the variation
in cushions. This is around 60% for gender, education and age, regardless of whether we
condition on CBA effects on not. It is closer to 70% for the coefficients associated with firm
profitability deciles when we don’t condition on CBA effects, but rises to around 90% when
we look at wages within CBA’s. Descriptively, wage cushions appear to play a relatively
large role in maintaining wage flexibility in the presence of sectorally bargained wage floors.
16This estimate comes from regressing the estimated decile effects in column 6 on those in column 5.
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4 Determinants of Negotiated Wage Floors
In this section we turn to an analysis of the determinants of negotiated wage floor increases.
Our first goal is to try to understand how the wage floors within a given CBA move relative
to each other. To foreshadow our results, we find that in nearly all cases the floors are
adjusted proportionally, so there is a single number – representing the mean increment in
wage floors – that fully summarizes the negotiation results. Our second goal is to study how
the rate of adjustment of wage floors responds to demand conditions at the firms covered by
the CBA.
4.1 Simple models of wage floor adjustment
As a starting point, consider a series of increasingly rich models for the change in the real
wage floor of group g when CBA c is renegotiated in year t :
∆fcgt = δt + εcgt (4a)
= δt + ZctδZ + εcgt (4b)
= δct + εcgt (4c)
= δct +RcgtδR + εcgt (4d)
(Note that ∆fcgt involves a change over different numbers of years, depending on when
contract c was last negotiated). Model (4a) includes only year effects: the fit of such a model
allows us to assess how far are CBA renegotiations in Portugal from the “fully centralized”
benchmark that is often taken as a normative ideal by macroeconomists (e.g., Calmfors and
Driffill, 1988). Model (4b) adds some contract-specific characteristics Zct - most importantly,
the duration of time since the last negotiation, which can range from 1 year to 3 years, or
even longer in a few cases. Model (4c) includes a set of contract-specific fixed effects, which
fully absorb any CBA×year factors, like industry-wide demand shocks or changes in local
labor market conditions that affect workers in the contract. The fit of this model allows
us to assess the extent to which all floors within a given CBA move together. Finally,
model (4d) adds a set of characteristics Rcgt of the workers covered by wage floor c, g, and
asks whether there is any evidence that floors within the same CBA are adjusted to reflect
the characteristics of the covered workers in different floor groups, controlling for the mean
contract-level change in floors (captured by δct).
Table 5 presents adjusted R2 statistics for variants of these 4 sets of models, estimated
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using the changes in mean real wage floors for workers in our matched QP-BTE data base.
We estimate the models by weighted OLS, using as weights the number of workers in floor
group g of CBA c.
The fit of fully centralized model (4a) (row 1) is surprisingly good, with an adjusted R2
statistic of close to 80%, suggesting that most of the variation in wage floor adjustments
is explained by just 7 year effects. Adding controls for industry, worker characteristics and
time since last negotiation (row 4) raises the adjusted R2 to 85%; adding industry×year
effects (row 5) raises it to nearly 90%.
The specification in row 6 adds contract-year effects (i.e., model 4c). These increase the
adjusted R2 to 98%, leaving almost no unexplained within-contract variation in wage floors.
Adding controls for the mean fraction female, mean age and mean education of workers
covered by each floor (model 4d) increases the fit only very slightly. These variables have
very small but statistically significant effects, showing slightly faster growth in floors that
cover a higher share of women, older workers, and fewer highly educated workers.
Overall we reach three conclusions from this simple analysis. First, nearly 80% of the
variation in average negotiated wage floors across our sample is explained by year effects.
Second, about one half of remaining variation is explained by industry-specific shocks, work-
force demographics, and the lag since the last negotiation. Third, nearly all the remaining
variation is explained by CBA-specific effects, meaning that in a typical negotiation all the
floors are adjusted by the same percentage.
4.2 Modeling contract-wide mean changes in floors
Building on the findings in Table 5, we turn to an analysis of the determinants of the mean
wage floor adjustment, δct in a given sectoral contract negotiation (estimated from a model
like equation 4c). Our main focus is on the question of how wage floor increases are affected
by changes in productivity/profitability of firms covered by the CBA. In particular, we are
interested in whether firms with faster productivity growth exert a stronger influence on
negotiations than less profitable firms (Boeri et al., 2019; Fanfani, 2020), potentially driving
the latter out of business. We proceed by examining the effects of changes in the mean and
various quantiles of the distribution of value added per worker among the firms affected by
the contract.
Let m(V Act) represent the mean of log value added per worker in year t for firms covered
by sectoral CBA c, and let q(V Act) represent the q
th quantile (e.g., the 25th or 50th) of the
distribution of log value added among these firms. Assume that contract c is renegotiated in
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year t and was last renegotiated in t− ` (so ` = 1, 2, 3 is the years since last renegotiation).
Then the changes in productivity relevant for the renegotiation can be summarized by:
DmV Act = m(V Ajct−1)−m(V Ajct−`−1)
DqV Act = q(V Ajct−1)− q(V Ajct−`−1).
Note that we lag the financial information by a year, reflecting the fact that a contract that
is updated in year t will have been negotiated before financial information from the current
year is realized.17
Our first set of models for floor adjustments in contract c, presented in Table 6, take the
form:
δct = β0 + β1DxV Act + β2Zct + ect (5)
where DxV Act is the change in the mean or some quantile of the distribution of value added
per worker among relevant firms, and Zct are a set of contract-specific covariates, including
time effects, dummies for the number of years since the last renegotiation, a measure of
cumulative inflation since the last negotiation, and measures of the share of females, the
share of university graduates, and the mean age of workers covered by the contract. Column
1 shows a model using DmeanV Act as the measure of demand-side factors, while columns
2-6 replace this with DqV Act based on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles.
Judging by the adjusted R-squared statistic, the change in the mean of value added among
firms covered by a CBA is the best predictor of negotiated wage floor changes, though the
median is a close second. The magnitude of the estimated β1 coefficient suggests that wage
floors are relatively responsive to the central tendency in industry-wide productivity growth,
with an elasticity of wages to mean or median changes in value added of around 0.06-0.07.
There also appears to be some limited “catch up” for past inflation: the model in column 1,
for example, implies that real wages recover about one-fifth of their lost value arising from
inflation since the last negotiation.18 Finally, consistent with the evidence in Figures 3a and
3b, floors covering more female workers tended to rise more quickly in the 2008-2016 period,
while floors covering more university-educated workers tended to fall slightly.
17Note that we use the change in the qth quantile of V Ajct , rather than the qth quantile of the change
in V Ajct, to summarize the distribution of demand shocks among firms covered by a given contract. Under
the rank invariance assumption that is widely used in the quantile treatment effects literature (e.g., Firpo
2007) these are the same.
18Since all the models in Table 6 include year effects and dummies for the number of years since the last
negotiation, the identification of the lagged inflation effect relies on relatively small differences in inflation
over different time windows in our sample period.
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A potential concern with the models in Table 6 is that changes in firm-specific value
added contain transitory fluctuations (and/or measurement errors) that are not completely
eliminated by using the industry-wide means or medians. Such fluctuations/errors may play
an outsize role in driving measured changes in the upper and lower quantiles. To address
this issue, we conducted a complementary analysis of longer-run changes in contractual wage
floors. Specifically, for all CBA’s that were renegotiated at least once between 2010 and 2016,
we constructed the average change in wage floors from 2010 to 2016, then fit a series of models
relating this longer-run change to corresponding changes in the mean and quantiles of value
added per worker for firms covered by the CBA. The results are presented in Table 7. We
present specifications with no other controls in the upper panel, and models that control for
the modal industry of the covered firms (with a total of 7 dummies) in the lower panel.
As expected, these models show a somewhat higher elasticity of wage floors with respect
to productivity changes among covered firms, with a point estimate of 0.093 for the effect of
the change in mean log value added when major industry dummies are included in the model
and 0.134 when they are excluded. They also show less attenuation in the magnitude of the
responsiveness of wage floors to the upper and lower quantiles of the change in log value
added. Nevertheless, as in Table 6, the best fitting models are those that relate changes
in wage floors to changes in the central tendency of productivity change among covered
firms. Moreover, if we estimate models that include both the median (or mean) change in
value added and one of the other quantiles (see Appendix Table D1), we find that all the
explanatory power comes from the median or mean change.
The magnitudes of the estimated elasticity of wage floors with respect to mean or median
changes in value-added in Table 7 are comparable or larger than typical estimates in the rent
sharing literature (see Card et al., 2018). We note, however, that if changes in wage floors
lead to some compression of wage cushions (as we find to be the case in the next section)
then the impact of value added changes on average wages will be smaller than the impact
on wage floors. In fact, we find that only about one-half of a rise in wage floors is passed
on to wages - the other half is absorbed by reductions in wage cushions. Thus, the implied
elasticity of workers’ wages with respect to rises in productivity among firms covered by the
relevant CBA is between 4 and 7 percent - closer to the middle of the range of estimates in
the rent-sharing literature.
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5 Effect of Wage Floors on Wages
In this section we analyze the effect of changes in wage floors on the actual wages of workers.
Conceptually, our approach builds on a simple technique that is widely used to study the
“passthrough” of an increase in sales taxes to the final price paid by consumers. We relate
the actual wage changes for workers at a firm to the simulated changes that would occur if
floors were adjusted but all other components of wages remained fixed.
Consider the set Ejt−1 of employees at a given firm j in year t− 1. Let ∆fit represent the
percentage change in the real wage floor between t− 1 and t for worker i in this set. If the
CBA covering the worker was renegotiated in the past year then ∆fit is just the negotiated
floor adjustment in that contract (adjusted for inflation). If the CBA was not renegotiated
then ∆fit is minus the percentage change in the price deflator between t − 1 and t. Using
the notation introduced in section 2, let Wit−1 represent the level of the monthly base wage
of the worker in year t− 1 and let Fit−1 represent the level of her wage floor. We define:
∆w∗it ≡ ln(Wit−1 + Fit−1∆fit)− ln(Wit−1) (6)
≈ (Fit−1/Wit−1)∆fit,
which is just the simulated increase in the log base wage of worker i if her wage floor were
increased by the proportion ∆fit and there was no change in the gap between her base wage
and her wage floor.
The actual change in the worker’s base wage includes the change in Hit, the gap (in
Euros) between her base wage and her floor:
∆wit = ln(Wit−1 + Fit−1∆fit + ∆Hit)− ln(Wit−1)
≈ (Fit−1/Wit−1)(∆fit + ∆Hit/Fit−1)
= ∆w∗it(1 + γit) (7)
where γit = ∆Hit/∆Fit is the ratio of the change in the absolute cushion component for
worker i to the absolute change in her wage floor. To illustrate the implications of this
equation, consider two limiting cases. At one extreme, suppose that Hit remains constant
as the wage floor changes (as is assumed in the construction of ∆w∗it). Under this scenario
γit = 0, and (7) implies that ∆wit = ∆w
∗
it. At the opposite extreme, suppose that the base
wage Wit remains constant as the wage floor is raised (a situation that can only happen if
Wit−1 > Fit – i.e., the initial base wage is above the new floor). Under this scenario, γit = −1
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and ∆wit = 0 – i.e., an increase in floors is fully offset by a reduction in the worker’s wage
cushion.19 Note that we can also construct a parallel measure of the effect of floor increases
on a worker’s total wage under the assumption that the gap between the worker’s total wage
and her floor stays constant, and compare that to the change in her total wage, ∆wTit .
To proceed, consider a simple regression model relating ∆wit to ∆w
∗
it and a set of controls
(Xit):
∆wit = θ0 + θ1∆w
∗
it + θxXit + ξit (8)
We focus on estimating this model for the set of workers who remain at the firm between
t−1 and t and stay in the same wage floor group – a group we refer to as the “firm stayers.”
The coefficient θ1 provides a measure of the effect of wage floors on the base wage of stayers.
A salient null hypothesis is θ1 = 1, which corresponds to the hypothesis that increases in
wage floors are passed through fully to workers. If rising wage floors are partially absorbed
by a reduction in wage cushions, however, then θ1 < 1, and in the limiting case in which
floor increases have no effect on wages, θ1 = 0.
A potential concern in estimating a model of wage changes for stayers is that workers who
remain with the firm may be selected in a way that is correlated with their potential wage
increase, leading to selection bias in the error term ξit. To address this, and to set the stage
for the employment growth models we present in the next section, we present instrumental
variable (IV) estimates that use ∆w∗jt (the mean of ∆w
∗
it across all Njt−1 employees of the
worker’s firm in year t − 1, including stayers and non-stayers) as an instrument for the
worker-specific simulated wage increase.
Estimation results for a variety of specifications of equation (8) are presented in Table 8.
Columns 1-4 present models for the effect of floors on base wages while columns 5-8 present
a parallel set of models for total wages.
As a point of departure, columns 1 and 5 present simple OLS models based on equation
(8). The control variables include year effects and dummies for female gender and university
education, as well as a linear term in the worker’s age. We also add the change in log real
value-added per worker at the employer. This is meant to control for firm-specific demand
shocks that may be jointly correlated with the unexplained component of base wage increases
(i.e., ξit) and the increase in wage floors affecting the firm.
The models for base wages (column 1) and total wages (column 5) yield estimates of
θ1 ≈ 0.45; in both cases the estimates are relatively precise. Corresponding IV models
19A third scenario is one in which each worker’s proportional cushion hit remains constant as floors change.
In this case ∆wit = ∆fit.
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that use ∆w∗jt as an instrumental variable for ∆w
∗
it are presented in columns 2 and 6. The
estimated first stage effects of ∆w∗jt on ∆w
∗
it are reported in the second last row of the
table: in both cases the first stage coefficients are close to 1.0 in magnitude and highly
significant. Interestingly, the IV estimates of θ1 are about 15% larger in magnitude than the
OLS estimates, suggesting that ξit is negatively correlated with ∆w
∗
it.
Given that the first stage coefficient of ∆w∗jt is close to 1, the IV estimates of θ1 in
columns 2 and 5 are (approximately) equal to the reduced form effects of ∆w∗jt on ∆wit
or ∆wTit . Moreover, in the absence of individual-level covariates these reduced-form effects
would be numerically equivalent to the effects obtained from a firm-level regression model
relating the average wage increase for all stayers at the firm (∆wjt) to ∆w
∗
jt and controls:
∆wjt = ρ0 + ρ1∆w
∗
jt + ρxXjt + ξjt (9)
Our individual-level models include individual-specific gender, education and age controls so
we cannot quite reproduce the micro-level estimates from the firm level regression. However,
as shown in columns 3 and 7, when we estimate equation (9) using firm-wide averages of the
covariates as controls we find, as expected, that the estimates of ρ1 are approximately equal
to the corresponding IV estimates of θ1.
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Finally, the specifications in columns 4 and 8 interact ∆w∗jt with a variable indicating
the fraction of all workers at the firm whose wage floor was renegotiated between t− 1 and
t. (For the 90% of firms in which all workers are covered by a single CBA, this fraction is
either 0 or 1, depending on whether the CBA was recently renegotiated or not, but for firms
where different occupation groups are covered by different CBA’s it can be strictly between
0 and 1). This interaction term allows us to check whether the responsiveness of wages to
floor changes is the same when wage floors are explicitly adjusted upward by a contract
renegotiation as when they are passively adjusted (typically downward) by inflation.21 The
estimated interaction effects are statistically indistinguishable from 0, providing no evidence
of asymmetry in the passthrough of wage floor changes.
The estimates in Table 8 suggest that on average only about one-half of the implied
increases in wages arising from changes in wage floors are passed through to workers. The
balance is offset by reductions in wage cushions, with relatively small effects on supplemen-
tary wage payments, given the similarity of the passthrough effects on base wages and total
20The standard errors are about the same too, which is expected given that we cluster the standard errors
by firm.
21During our sample period there were two years with negative inflation in Portugal.
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wages. The ability of a given worker’s wage cushion to absorb an increase in wage floors,
however, depends on the size of their wage cushion. In the minimum wage literature a typical
finding is that workers who are initially earning less than a newly increased minimum will
have their wage fully “topped up” (i.e., ∆wit = ∆w
∗
it), while those who are earning slightly
above the new minimum will get a raise that is not quite proportional to the rise in the
minimum (i.e., 0 < ∆wit <∆w
∗
it), and those who are earning substantially above the new
minimum will be unaffected (i.e., ∆wit = 0).
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We explore the heterogeneity in the degree of passthrough of wage floor increases in Table
9. Each row represents a different skill group (classified by gender, education, and age). For
each group we report the share of all firm stayers in the group, the mean relative wage
floor, mean wage cushion and mean supplements for members of the group (as measured in
year t − 1), and group-specific estimates of the passthrough effect based on the aggregated
reduced form model of equation (9). We exclude results for people age 18-24 with a university
education because for both genders this group is extremely small.
As expected, the estimated passthrough rates tend to be larger for groups with lower
wage cushions. For example, females with less than high school education who are between
25 and 44 have an average wage cushion of roughly 8 log points, and estimated passthrough
rates of 0.71 (st. err=0.02) using base wages or 0.63 (st. err=0.07) using total monthly
wages. By comparison, females in the same age range with a university education have
an average wage cushion of roughly 48 log points, and estimated passthrough rates of 0.31
(st. err=0.05) and 0.37 (st. err=0.08). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4, where
we plot the estimated passthrough rate for each demographic group (estimated using base
wages) against the mean wage cushion for the group. We draw two main conclusions from
this graph. First, even for low-cushion groups the passthrough rate is less than 1, suggesting
that the modest floor increases typically negotiated during our sample period (in the range of
1-3 percent) were partly absorbed by compressing wage cushions. Second, in contrast to the
pattern found in the minimum wage literature, wage floor increases in collective bargaining
agreements appear to have some “spillover” effect even on relatively high-cushion groups.
22See Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd (forthcoming) and Cengiz et al. (2019) for overviews of the existing
literature and evidence on spillover effects of minimum wages in the U.S. labor market.
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6 Effect of Wage Floors on Employment
Although increases in wage floors are partly absorbed by compression of wage cushions, they
still lead to some increase in workers’ base wages and total salaries. This opens up the
question of whether firms use reductions in employment as another channel of adjustment to
higher floors. Such employment effects might be expected if employment and wage outcomes
lie on a traditional downward-sloping employment demand function. To the extent that
wages are endogenously set by firms with market power, however, the equilibrium relationship
is less clear and may even be upward-sloping.
Building on the results in Table 8 we fit a series of simple models of the form:
∆ lnEjt = τ0 + τ1∆w
∗
jt + τxXjt + ζjt (10)
where ∆w∗jt is the average simulated change in total base wages of employees present at the
firm in period t − 1. We estimate this model for all firms, and separately for the subset of
firms where the modal worker at the firm is covered by a sectoral CBA.23 For the latter set
of firms wage floors are arguably somewhat more exogenous to firm-specific conditions.
The results are presented in Table 10. We show a specification with only year effects and
a control for the increase in real value added per worker at the firm in columns 1 and 4, a
second model with controls for gender, fraction of university educated workers, and mean
age of workers in columns 2 and 5, and a specification that allows for an interaction between
∆w∗jt and the share of workers with a renegotiated wage floor in columns 3 and 6.
The estimation results are quite similar for the models estimated on all firms and on the
subset covered by sectoral contracts, and point to three main conclusions. First, increases in
firm-specific productivity (as measured by the change in real value added per worker) have
a significant positive effect on employment growth, about 10× larger in magnitude than the
effect on wages.
Second, none of the models show a negative effect of floor increases on employment
growth. The model in column 2, for example, yields an estimate of τ̂1 = 0.165 for the effect of
floor-induced base wage increases on employment. If one assumes that firms set employment
taking wages as “exogenous” then one could convert this estimate into a demand elasticity
by dividing by the estimate of ρ1. Using the estimate of ρ1 from column 2 of Table 8 yields an
estimate of the elasticity of employment with respect to base wages of 0.30, with a standard
23As noted, about 90% of firms have only a single CBA, but for firms where workers are covered by 2 or
more different CBA’s we assign sectoral coverage status based on the characteristics of the agreement that
covers the largest number of workers.
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error of approximately 0.33. While this point estimate is positive, a 95% confidence interval
ranges from -0.36 to 0.96, so we cannot rule out small negative employment responses.
A third finding, consistent with the results in Table 8, is that there is no evidence of
asymmetry in reactions to actively renegotiated wage floor changes versus changes in real
wage floors arising from inflation.
The models in Table 10 describe employment outcomes for all workers. The results in
Table 9, however, suggest that the wage impacts of wage floor increases vary across groups.
To check whether there is similar heterogeneity in the employment impacts, we estimated
models like (10) by gender, education, and age group. The results are presented in Appendix
Table E1, alongside the corresponding estimates of the wage effects for each group from
Table 9. Ten of the 16 estimated employment effects are positive while six are negative.
Moreover, apart from a relatively large negative employment effect for the relatively small
group of young women with less than a high school education, the general pattern is for the
employment effects to be more negative for groups with higher wage cushions - the opposite
of the pattern that would be expected if wage floor increases are choking off employment for
groups with low wage cushions.24
Since young workers have small average wage cushions (see Figure 3d), the findings in
Table 9 suggest that their wages may have been pushed up relatively more by increases in
wage floors over the past decade, preventing firms from hiring them in the first place - an
effect that may be hard to discern from models of employment growth such as equation (10).
While a full analysis of this concern is beyond our scope, Appendix Figure E1 shows data
on the fractions of young men and young women (age 16-24) who were not in employment,
education or training in Portugal and 6 other countries (Italy, U.S., Spain, France, U.K., and
Germany) over the 2004-2019 period. The so-called “NEET” rates for both gender groups
in Portugal track the rates in other countries fairly closely: there is not much evidence
of a relative rise in the post-crisis era. For example, comparing Portugal to the U.S., the
difference in differences of NEET rates for 2017-2019 versus 2004-2007 is -0.3% for males
and +1.4% for females. Parallel differences of differences relative to the U.K. are -4.4% for
young men and -3.7% for young women. The only country that did appreciably better than
Portugal (and virtually all other countries) was Germany.
24The correlation of τ̂1 and ρ̂1 across the 16 groups is 0.21, rising to 0.67 if we exclude women age 18-24
with less than high school education.
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7 Decomposing Changes in Real Wages, 2010-2016
In this section we combine the insights from the previous sections and document how the
various components of wages contributed to overall changes in wages for the economy as
a whole and for different groups over the 2010-2016 period. Our approach builds on the
methodology developed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) – hereafter DFL – for an-
alyzing the effects of trade unions and minimum wages on trends in U.S. wage inequality.
Specifically, we conduct a series of counterfactual simulations – described in Table 11 – that
provide a step-by-step decomposition of the changes in mean total monthly real wages for
different groups of workers.
We start with scenario A, which takes all workers in our matched QP-BTE sample in
2010. Outcomes in this sample represent the actual distribution of wages in 2010. Next, in
scenario B, we increment the wage floor that applies to each worker in 2010 by the percentage
change of that floor between 2010 and 2016, but hold constant each worker’s (proportional)
wage cushion and (proportional) wage supplements. A comparison of outcomes between
scenario B and the baseline scenario A allows us to assess what would have happened if
floors adjusted as they did between 2010 and 2016, but all workers remained in their same
floor categories, and received the same cushions and supplements as they did in 2010.
In scenario C, we reweight the observations in scenario B by the relative probability that
workers in a given gender/education/age cell were present in the labor market in 2016 versus
2010. Following the logic of DFL, this reweighting allows us to assess how the changing
demographic composition of the workforce would have affected wage outcomes, holding con-
stant the assignment of workers to their 2010 wage floor groups, with their 2010 cushions
and supplements, but with 2016 floors.
In scenario D, we take all workers in our matched QP-BTE sample in 2016, but assign
each worker in a given wage floor group a randomly drawn wage cushion and wage sup-
plement from their respective distributions in the same wage floor group in 2010 .25
Relative to scenario C (which has 2010 workers in their 2010 floor groups but assigned the
2016 floors) scenario D captures any reallocation of workers across wage floor groups, while
holding constant wage floors at their 2016 values, and the distributions of wage cushions and
supplements for workers in a given floor group at their 2010 distributions. We note that this
reallocation effect reflects a combination of within-job effects, between-job effects, and entry
effects. Within jobs, a change in the rate at which workers are promoted to higher wage floor
25This re-assignment approach builds on DFL, who assessed the effect of a national changing minimum
wage by assigning the lower tail of wages from one year to the distribution of wages in another year.
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categories will lead workers in a given age range in 2016 to be assigned to better or worse
wage floor groups than they would have been assigned to in 2010. For job changers, any shift
in the probabilities of moving up or down the “job ladder” (as measured by the level of the
wage floors at the origin and destination job) will likewise lead to a change in the assignment
of workers to wage floors. Finally, any change in the assignment of labor market entrants
(or re-entrants) to wage floor groups will contribute to the overall reallocation effect.
In scenario E, we adjust scenario D by assigning each worker his or her actual wage
cushion in 2016. A comparison with scenario D allows us to assess the impact of changes in
the distribution of wage cushions within a given wage floor group. Finally, Scenario F just
takes the distribution of workers in 2016 with their 2016 floors, cushions and supplements.
This differs from scenario E by the updating of the distribution of wage supplements from
2010 to 2016, allowing us to quantify the impact of changing wage supplements.
Table 12 summarizes the comparisons across these different scenarios for the overall
population of workers and various subgroups. We begin by showing the mean log total
monthly wage in 2010 (column 1) and the components of this total, as described by equation
(2) (columns 2-4). Next we show the actual change in mean log wages between 2010 and
2016, which was -1.7% for workers as a whole, but ranged between -20% (for some university-
educated groups) to +0.7% (for women with less than high school education who were
between 25 and 44).
Column 6 shows the difference in mean log wages between scenario B and scenario A,
and summarizes the impact of changing wage floors. On average real wage floors declined
by about 2.2%, but the mean floors affecting young and less educated workers actually rose
slightly, reflecting the influence of the minimum wage, which increased by 3.5% between
2010 and 2016 (adjusting for inflation) and pushed up some of the lowest wage floors in the
economy.
Column 7 shows the effect of demographic change captured by the difference between sce-
nario C and scenario B. (Note that within any of the narrowly defined gender/education/age
groups in the bottom panel of the table this difference is 0). On average education levels
were rising quickly in Portugal between 2010 and 2016, a trend that would have increased
wages by about 7.4% in the absence of other factors.
Offsetting the rise in education levels was a reallocation of workers across floor groups,
the effects of which are captured by the differences in mean wages between scenarios D and
C, presented in column 8. On average workers were being reallocated to lower-paying job
over our sample period, leading to a nearly 5% reduction in real wages. The effects of this
29
downgrading were particularly large for older university-educated and high-school educated
workers, and were negligible for younger, less educated workers who were already working
at jobs with the lowest wage floors.
Finally, columns 9 and 10 show the effects of changes in wage cushions and wage sup-
plements. On average wage cushions declined over the course of the financial crisis, with
larger declines for groups that were initially earning larger average cushions. In contrast, the
value of wage supplements was relatively stable, though groups with the largest declines in
floors and cushions experienced small increases in the value of their supplemental payments.
This reflects the fact that some components of supplementary payments are expressed in
absolute terms (such as meal allowance payments), and as the base wage of a group declines
the relative value of their supplementary payments will rise.
The general pattern of the different components in columns 7-10 is illustrated in Figure 5.
We plot the overall change in log wages for each of the 18 demographic groups highlighted in
Table 12 against their mean log wage in 2010, along with the contributions of floor updates,
changes in cushions and supplemental payments, and the effect of re allocations across floor
groups. The figure shows that the reductions in real wages for higher-paid groups in the
Portuguese labor market between 2010 and 2016 reflected the combined effects of falling
wage floors, reduced wage cushions, and re allocations to lower-paying floor categories.
One way to summarize the relative contributions of these different components to the





represents the change in the real average total wage of skill group s between 2010 and 2016,





these terms sum to 1. Following this approach we estimate that changes in real wage floors
accounted for 24% of the between-skill group variation in real wages reductions, changes in
real wage cushions accounted for 26%, re allocation across floor group accounted for 56%,
and changes in real supplemental payments accounted for -6%.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to provide a simple framework for thinking about the effect of
“European style” sectoral wage contracts on wage inequality and patterns of wage changes for
different individuals and groups over time. Our approach builds on earlier work by Cardoso
and Portugal (2005). As they (and many subsequent authors) have noted, a key feature
that distinguishes European style contracts from union contracts in the U.S. is that most
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workers receive an idiosyncratic wage cushion that “tops up” their wage over the contractual
wage floor. We therefore adopt some of the methods that have been developed to study the
effect of minimum wages - specifically models of wage spillovers – to the study of sectoral
wage floors. We also extend the seminal approach of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996)
to develop a series of counterfactuals that allow us to show how changes in wage floors,
changes in wage cushions, and re-allocations of workers across different floor categories all
contributed to wage adjustments over the past decade in Portugal.
Since wage cushions are set by the employer, rather than by the sectoral bargain itself,
they introduce an important source of wage flexibility both to the cross-sectional wage dis-
tribution at a point in time, and to changes in wages for individuals and groups over time.
We show that variation in wage cushions contributes significantly to many of the standard
“wage gaps” in the labor market, including differences by gender, education, age, and be-
tween more and less profitable employers. The variation in wage cushions is particularly
important in allowing wages to vary between more and less profitable firms covered by the
same sectoral agreement, addressing a concern about sectoral bargaining that is widely raised
by policymakers.
We also show that when wage floors are renegotiated in a sectoral wage bargain, only
about one-half of the increase is passed through to workers’ wages. The other half is absorbed
by a reduction in wage cushions. As has been well documented in the study of minimum
wages, the passthrough effect of sectoral wage floors is larger for workers whose wages are
closer to the floor (i.e., those with a smaller wage cushion), but in our setting at least we
find some degree of passthrough even for workers whose wages are far above the floor for
their job category.
We do not find any evidence that employers adjust to rising wage floors by cutting
employment. This may not be too surprising in a setting where the vast majority of workers
are receiving an employer-determined wage cushion that places their wage above the floor: a
growing body of evidence around the world suggests that when wages are set by employers
the effect of minimum wage increases is small.
Our counterfactual analysis of wage changes from before to after the recent financial
crisis in Portugal shows that the remarkable declines in real wages for many groups were
accomplished by a combination of declining real wage floors, declining real wage cushions,
and a re allocation of workers across wage floor categories. The re allocation effect was
particularly important for higher-educated groups, who entered new jobs at lower floors
than would have been expected prior to the crisis and were also promoted less quickly to
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higher wage floor categories.
An important limitation of our study is that we only have data for one country. It is
possible that some of the flexibility we document in the Portuguese labor market is absent in
other labor markets. For example, institutional or legal restrictions may make it impossible
for firms in other labor markets to reduce the wage cushion component when sectoral wage
floors are increased. Providing evidence on how floors and cushions interact in other countries
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Appendix A: Assigning Wage Floors from BTE to Workers in QP
We assigned workers in the linked employer-employee dataset (QP) to wage floors published
in the Labor Bulletin (Boletim do Trabalho e Emprego, BTE). Appendix Table A1 reports
the constraints on the collective bargaining agreements (CBA’s) published in BTE that we
imposed to define our analysis sample. In turn, Appendix Table A2 reports the constraints
we imposed on the QP dataset.
A total of 1,467 contracts including wage clauses were published in BTE between January
2008 and December 2016. Parallel agreements were signed by different trade unions with
the same employer(s), presenting exactly the same contents. We identified 406 such redun-
dant contracts, leaving 1,061 “consolidated” CBA’s eligible for analysis. Fifty contracts fall
outside the set of industries under study, whereas 23 fall outside the geographic scope of the
analysis. Hence we consider 988 non-duplicate contracts within the scope of our analysis.
However, a few contracts (two) were never enforced over the period October 2008 to
2016; another 22 agreements do not appear to have any covered workers in QP in the 2008-
2016 period. An additional 267 contracts defined wage floors conditional on information
that cannot be identified in QP. In some cases this information pertains the worker (such
as academic grades, subjective evaluations of CV or performance, type of schedule, or her
progression along a set of occupational “steps”); in other cases this information pertains
to the firm (such as the category of the establishment in accommodation, food and leisure
services, or the average corporate income tax paid in the recent past). Therefore, the analysis
set includes 697 collective bargaining agreements.
We restricted the QP dataset to wage-earners aged 18 to 64, with non-missing base wage,
education and date of hire, reported working full-time; we also excluded agriculture and fish-
eries, those working in Madeira and the Azores, apprentices, and workers in accounting firms.
These constraints resulted in a dataset of 16.6 million observations worker-year. Eleven per-
cent of these workers were reported not covered by a CBA. Another 7% were reported as
covered by a CBA but the job category was not specified. For 10%, no renegotiation of the
collective bargaining contract took place between 2008 and 2016; and for a residual 1% a
floor update was identified, but its dates of enforcement fell outside our analysis period.
For approximately one fourth of the workforce, we were unable to assigned a wage floor,
either because: we could not find the worker’s floor group in BTE, even though we found
her contract (3% of the observations); or the identified wage floor was actually enforced
retrospectively and the wage floor at the time of QP was unknown (˜ 1% of observations);
or the wage floor depended on information that could not be identified in QP. Hence our
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analysis sample includes 7.3 million observation worker-year.
Appendix B: Dynamics of CBA coverage
In a given year, individuals can be classified into 3 states: c = employed in covered job;
n = employed in uncovered job; o = out of work (i.e., not in QP). Let N ij(t) represent
the number of workers who move from state i to state j between t − 1 and t, let N ·j(t)
represent the number in state j in period t (aggregating across all previous states) and let
N i·(t − 1) represent the number in state i in year t − 1 (aggregating across all subsequent
states). Finally, let E(t) = N ·c(t)+N ·n(t) represent the number of employed workers in year


























δn(t− 1) = N
no(t)
Nn·(t− 1)
represent the fraction of noncovered workers in year t−1 who are out of employment in year
t, and similarly let
δc(t− 1) = N
co(t)
N c(t− 1)
represent the fraction of covered workers in year t−1 who are out of employment in year t.
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N cc(t) +N cn(t)
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represent the fraction of the employed workforce in period t who were not employed in t− 1.
Then



















The term λnc is the transition rate from an uncovered job in t − 1 to a covered job in t,
while λcc is the retention rate from a covered job in t − 1 to a covered job in t. The terms
w1 and w2 are adjustment factors that account for transitions out of work, and for overall
employment growth between periods. Note that if there is no flow of workers in or out of
employment between periods then w1t = w2t = 1, and µ(t) = 0, so equation (B1) becomes
the simple flow equation:
C(t) = λnc(t)(1− C(t− 1)) + λcc(t)C(t− 1).
Appendix Table B1 shows employment counts in the current and past year, the transition
rates λnc(t), λcc(t), λoc(t), the attrition rates δn(t−1), δc(t−1), the share of current employees
who were not working last year, µ(t), and the adjustment factors w1t, w2t for equation (B1).
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Figure 1: Example of Wage Table from BTE 
Contrato coletivo entre a Associação da Hotelaria, Restauração  
e Similares de Portugal (AHRESP) e o Sindicato dos Trabalhadores 
e Técnicos de Serviços - SITESE - Alteração salarial e outras 
Níveis Grupo A Grupo B 
XII 960,0 € 930,0 € 
XI 895,0 € 887,0 € 
X 770,0 € 735,0 € 
IX 700,0 € 670,0 € 
VIII 630,0 € 610,0 € 
VII 585,0 € 575,0 € 
VI 540,0 € 540,0 € 
V 532,0 € 532,0 € 
IV 531,0 € 531,0 € 
III 530,0 € 530,0 € 
II 450,0 € 450,0 € 

























































































































































































































































































Number Months  Number of Percent Covered Workers with Percent of
Contracts Percent Since Last Workers in  Covered by Sectoral Assigned  All Workers Number 
Year in BTE Sectoral Contract QP by CBA CBA Floors in QP with Floor of Floors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2008 192 58.9 20 1,966,522 90.0 75.0 634,300 32.3 1,935
2009 165 53.4 18 1,893,484 89.9 74.2 804,653 42.5 2,211
2010 140 61.4 20 1,897,345 91.4 75.2 835,011 44.0 2,357
2011 111 52.3 20 1,868,715 90.9 74.7 817,703 43.8 2,461
2012 50 38.0 25 1,768,599 89.1 71.6 832,861 47.1 2,566
2013 54 31.5 22 1,748,831 88.6 70.8 815,606 46.6 2,585
2014 83 34.9 26 1,778,271 88.4 70.6 825,698 46.4 2,619
2015 90 47.8 37 1,831,708 88.0 70.3 844,830 46.1 2,603
2016 103 46.6 29 1,884,758 87.0 69.6 855,602 45.4 2,641











All Covered Not Covered Floor Assigned No Floor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fraction female 0.452 0.448 0.476 0.420 0.476
Fraction with high school 0.242 0.240 0.256 0.233 0.248
Fraction with university 0.191 0.169 0.376 0.156 0.181
Mean years experience 23.85 24.32 19.98 24.50 24.14
Mean tenure current job 8.34 8.59 6.31 8.69 8.48
Mean log monthly base wage 6.696 6.675 6.858 6.664 6.686
  (standard deviation) (0.509) (0.495) (0.590) (0.491) (0.499)
Mean log monthly total wage 6.856 6.837 7.014 6.837 6.838
  (standard deviation) (0.532) (0.522) (0.586) (0.517) (0.528)





Mean Log Mean Relative Wage Mean Wage Mean Var.  Log Var. Rel. Var.  Var.  2 × Cov [Rel.
Total Wage Rel to Min. Floor Cushion Supplements Total Wage Wage Flr. Cushion Suppl. Flr. & Cush.]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Workers 6.84 0.61 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.267 0.086 0.112 0.024 0.042
 (Percent of Total) (40.2) (31.4) (28.4) (32.3) (42.1) (9.1) (15.6)
By Gender:
Males 6.91 0.68 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.286 0.091 0.129 0.030 0.039
(58.0% of obs.) (39.1) (34.0) (26.8) (31.9) (45.2) (10.3) (13.5)
Females 6.74 0.51 0.22 0.14 0.16 0.226 0.078 0.084 0.017 0.040
(42.0% of obs.) (42.3) (26.5) (31.2) (34.7) (37.3) (7.6) (17.8)
Gender Gap 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.060 0.013 0.045 0.012 ‐0.010
 (Percent of Gap) (29.7) (57.9) (13.3) (21.8) (74.7) (20.6) (‐16.6)
By Education:
<High School  6.65 0.43 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.123 0.031 0.061 0.021 0.010
(61.1% of obs.) (32.7) (28.8) (38.5) (25.2) (49.4) (16.7) (8.2)
High School 6.93 0.70 0.30 0.21 0.19 0.256 0.091 0.113 0.027 0.023
(23.3% of obs.) (42.7) (29.7) (27.6) (35.4) (43.9) (10.5) (8.8)
University 7.41 1.18 0.57 0.43 0.17 0.372 0.141 0.239 0.035 ‐0.023
(15.6% of obs.) (48.7) (36.6) (14.7) (37.8) (64.3) (9.4) (‐6.3)
HS/<HS Gap 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.134 0.060 0.052 0.006 0.012
 (Percent of Gap) (58.3) (31.2) (10.5) (44.8) (38.9) (4.8) (9.3)
University/HS Gap 0.48 0.48 0.28 0.22 ‐0.02 0.115 0.050 0.126 0.008 ‐0.046
 (Percent of Gap) (57.4) (46.3) (‐4.0) (43.1) (109.6) (7.1) (‐39.7)
By Quartile of Firm VA/Worker:
1st Quartile 6.51 0.28 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.076 0.027 0.044 0.011 ‐0.002
(25.0% of obs.) (38.4) (15.3) (46.3) (35.1) (57.5) (13.9) (‐2.3)
4th Quartile 7.19 0.96 0.37 0.41 0.18 0.321 0.114 0.183 0.034 0.043
(25.0% of obs.) (38.7) (42.2) (19.1) (35.6) (57.2) (10.5) (13.4)
4th‐1st Quartile 0.69 0.68 0.27 0.36 0.05 0.245 0.088 0.140 0.023 0.045




CBA Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female ‐0.054 ‐0.053 ‐0.086 ‐0.094 ‐0.140 ‐0.147 0.615 0.641
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Education (yrs.) 0.031 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.058 0.054 0.457 0.560
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.014 0.013 0.024 0.023 0.037 0.036 0.627 0.635
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age
2 / 100 ‐0.010 ‐0.010 ‐0.019 ‐0.018 ‐0.029 ‐0.028 0.650 0.631
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Indicators for Decile of Mean Log Value Added per Worker at Firm:
Decile 2 0.001 ‐0.004 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.010 0.934 1.434
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Decile 3 0.031 ‐0.001 0.021 0.044 0.052 0.043 0.399 1.016
(0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Decile 4 0.047 0.000 0.034 0.073 0.081 0.074 0.416 0.994
(0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Decile 5 0.030 0.009 0.077 0.097 0.107 0.106 0.718 0.913
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Decile 6 0.037 0.006 0.115 0.137 0.152 0.143 0.754 0.955
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Decile 7 0.042 0.016 0.155 0.174 0.197 0.191 0.787 0.915
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Decile 8 0.079 0.028 0.188 0.223 0.268 0.251 0.704 0.887
(0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Decile 9 0.114 0.039 0.246 0.290 0.360 0.329 0.684 0.882
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
Decile 10 0.234 0.052 0.336 0.414 0.570 0.466 0.589 0.888
(0.023) (0.004) (0.016) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012)
R‐squared 0.387 0.656 0.294 0.353 0.499 0.536 ‐‐ ‐‐
*Share of the effect of covariate in row heading on base wage that is attributable to effect on wage cushion.























Mean 10th Pctile 25th Pctile 50th Pctile 75th Pctile 90th Pctile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Real Value Added/Worker 0.068 0.007 0.037 0.067 0.034 0.032
(0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007)
Other Controls:
Cumulative Inflation since last  0.202 0.032 0.034 0.142 0.115 0.040
  renegotiation (0.086) (0.089) (0.074) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071)
Share of Females Covered by CBA 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.015
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of Univ. Grads Covered by CBA ‐0.002 ‐0.008 ‐0.008 ‐0.007 ‐0.006 ‐0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Mean Age of Workers Covered by CBA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year effects and dummies for time yes yes yes yes yes yes
  since last renegotiation







Mean 10th Pctile 25th Pctile 50th Pctile 75th Pctile 90th Pctile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No other control variables:
Change in Real Value Added/Worker 0.134 0.105 0.115 0.131 0.078 0.055
   (2009‐2015) (0.025) (0.027) (0.037) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026)
R‐squared 0.475 0.383 0.421 0.510 0.284 0.178
With Controls for Industry:
Change in Real Value Added/Worker 0.093 0.068 0.074 0.094 0.040 0.033
   (2009‐2015) (0.040) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036) (0.027) (0.025)







OLS IV** OLS OLS OLS IV** OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean of Simulated Change in 0.458 0.530 0.550 0.546 0.446 0.536 0.555 0.521
 Base or Total Wage
* 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049)
Change in Real Value‐added 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
 per Worker at Firm (Coeff×10) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Share of Workers with Reneg‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.000 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.000
 otiated Floor (Coeff×10) (0.005) (0.012)
Share with Renegotiated Floor ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.008 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.068
  × Mean Simulated Change (0.031) (0.050)
Demograhic Controls and  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
  Year Effects




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males
<High School, Age 18‐24 0.011 0.074 0.078 0.183 0.50 0.68
(0.06) (0.11)
<High School, Age 25‐44 0.206 0.162 0.203 0.182 0.47 0.54
(0.03) (0.09)
<High School, Age 45‐64 0.188 0.190 0.271 0.173 0.45 0.46
(0.03) (0.06)
High School, Age 18‐24 0.007 0.108 0.095 0.201 0.39 0.48
(0.09) (0.16)
High School, Age 25‐44 0.086 0.297 0.302 0.186 0.43 0.42
(0.05) (0.12)
High School, Age 45‐64 0.031 0.429 0.536 0.163 0.31 0.23
(0.04) (0.12)
University, Age 25‐44 0.061 0.545 0.613 0.125 0.33 0.29
(0.06) (0.09)
University, Age 45‐64 0.016 0.720 0.988 0.112 0.20 0.24
(0.06) (0.13)
Females
<High School, Age 18‐24 0.005 0.028 0.028 0.153 0.59 0.56
(0.04) (0.12)
<High School, Age 25‐44 0.121 0.093 0.075 0.157 0.71 0.63
(0.02) (0.07)
<High School, Age 45‐64 0.099 0.120 0.121 0.152 0.77 0.76
(0.03) (0.05)
High School, Age 18‐24 0.005 0.067 0.062 0.189 0.37 0.36
(0.13) (0.15)
High School, Age 25‐44 0.074 0.223 0.205 0.172 0.44 0.53
(0.04) (0.09)
High School, Age 45‐64 0.023 0.322 0.387 0.144 0.50 0.47
(0.04) (0.07)
University, Age 25‐44 0.057 0.442 0.477 0.129 0.31 0.37
(0.05) (0.08)



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of Simulated Change in 0.432 0.165 0.373 0.412 0.104 0.317
 Total Wage of Employees (using actual  (0.168) (0.177) (0.186) (0.179) (0.190) (0.198)
  Floor Changes)
Change in Real Value‐added 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.028
 per Worker at Firm  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of Workers with Reneg‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐0.030 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐0.027
 otiated Floors (Coeff×10) (0.037) (0.040)
Share with Renegotiated Floor ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐0.303 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐0.316
  × Mean Simulated Change (0.305) (0.316)
Demograhic Controls no yes yes no yes yes
Year Effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All 6.863 0.272 0.195 0.166 ‐0.017 ‐0.022 0.074 ‐0.048 ‐0.025 0.005
Males 6.931 0.293 0.234 0.174 ‐0.022 ‐0.028 0.077 ‐0.050 ‐0.026 0.006
Females 6.767 0.242 0.140 0.154 ‐0.001 ‐0.015 0.079 ‐0.045 ‐0.024 0.004
Educ<HS 6.677 0.164 0.122 0.160 ‐0.022 ‐0.014 0.009 ‐0.012 ‐0.007 0.002
Educ=HS 6.994 0.350 0.228 0.187 ‐0.126 ‐0.033 0.025 ‐0.092 ‐0.034 0.007
Educ=Univ.  7.491 0.633 0.468 0.160 ‐0.161 ‐0.044 0.019 ‐0.084 ‐0.062 0.010
Age 16‐24 6.582 0.137 0.040 0.176 ‐0.009 ‐0.004 0.040 ‐0.038 ‐0.016 0.009
Age 25‐44 6.870 0.282 0.192 0.167 ‐0.025 ‐0.024 0.071 ‐0.046 ‐0.029 0.004
Age 45‐64 6.907 0.281 0.234 0.163 ‐0.024 ‐0.023 0.065 ‐0.051 ‐0.020 0.006
Males by Education and Age
<HS, Age 16‐24 6.552 0.100 0.045 0.177 ‐0.024 0.000 0.000 ‐0.018 ‐0.010 0.005
<HS, Age 25‐44 6.723 0.176 0.145 0.172 ‐0.032 ‐0.022 0.000 ‐0.004 ‐0.007 0.002
<HS, Age 45‐64 6.820 0.218 0.206 0.167 ‐0.060 ‐0.027 0.000 ‐0.023 ‐0.013 0.002
HS, Age 16‐24 6.643 0.176 0.043 0.193 ‐0.056 ‐0.012 0.000 ‐0.040 ‐0.017 0.013
HS, Age 25‐44 7.065 0.390 0.250 0.195 ‐0.177 ‐0.037 0.000 ‐0.112 ‐0.035 0.006
HS, Age 45‐64 7.476 0.579 0.463 0.204 ‐0.209 ‐0.042 0.000 ‐0.132 ‐0.050 0.015
Univ, Age 16‐24 7.043 0.512 0.154 0.146 ‐0.147 ‐0.039 0.000 ‐0.094 ‐0.041 0.027
Univ, Age 25‐44 7.541 0.646 0.507 0.158 ‐0.181 ‐0.042 0.000 ‐0.075 ‐0.073 0.009
Univ, Age 45‐64 8.058 0.862 0.794 0.171 ‐0.185 ‐0.043 0.000 ‐0.113 ‐0.047 0.017
Females by Education and Age
<HS, Age 16‐24 6.465 0.067 0.011 0.158 ‐0.014 0.012 0.000 ‐0.021 ‐0.005 0.001
<HS, Age 25‐44 6.533 0.115 0.043 0.144 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.004 ‐0.001 0.002
<HS, Age 45‐64 6.601 0.150 0.081 0.140 ‐0.026 ‐0.003 0.000 ‐0.020 ‐0.006 0.003
HS, Age 16‐24 6.565 0.123 0.021 0.191 ‐0.048 ‐0.005 0.000 ‐0.035 ‐0.012 0.004
HS, Age 25‐44 6.840 0.277 0.159 0.174 ‐0.118 ‐0.031 0.000 ‐0.061 ‐0.029 0.003
HS, Age 45‐64 7.152 0.413 0.337 0.171 ‐0.185 ‐0.039 0.000 ‐0.112 ‐0.041 0.007
Univ, Age 16‐24 6.956 0.463 0.115 0.148 ‐0.156 ‐0.048 0.000 ‐0.083 ‐0.046 0.021
Univ, Age 25‐44 7.317 0.560 0.367 0.160 ‐0.175 ‐0.045 0.000 ‐0.073 ‐0.063 0.007


















































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2008 293 172 25 96 192 65.5 113 16 63
2009 246 141 21 82 165 67.1 88 16 59
2010 216 140 24 50 140 64.8 86 16 36
2011 167 93 22 51 111 66.5 58 14 38
2012 70 30 7 32 50 71.4 19 4 26
2013 78 25 16 37 54 69.2 17 10 27
2014 126 43 20 63 83 65.9 29 10 44
2015 131 66 15 49 90 68.7 43 9 37
2016 140 67 20 53 103 73.6 48 14 41














All Males Females 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Employment counts
E(t) 14,671,711 8,010,391 6,661,320 1,893,484 1,897,345 1,868,715 1,768,599 1,748,831 1,778,271 1,831,708 1,884,758
E(t‐1) 14,753,475 8,110,959 6,642,516 1,966,522 1,893,484 1,897,345 1,868,715 1,768,599 1,748,831 1,778,271 1,831,708




 (uncovered‐covered) 0.103 0.114 0.091 0.126 0.273 0.074 0.064 0.077 0.069 0.083 0.086
λcc (covered‐covered) 0.986 0.986 0.987 0.983 0.987 0.993 0.979 0.988 0.991 0.990 0.981
λnc (out of work‐covered) 0.881 0.883 0.878 0.883 0.896 0.900 0.884 0.882 0.880 0.866 0.856
Attrition Rates (probabilities of transitioning to out‐of‐QP)
δn (loss from uncovered) 0.222 0.211 0.235 0.294 0.322 0.193 0.197 0.186 0.194 0.188 0.201
δc (loss from covered) 0.217 0.211 0.223 0.233 0.255 0.218 0.231 0.204 0.193 0.197 0.197
Share of Employment in t that was out‐of‐QP in t‐1
μ 0.213 0.201 0.227 0.209 0.263 0.204 0.184 0.193 0.206 0.220 0.220
Adjustment Factors to account for out‐of‐QP
w1(t) 0.782 0.799 0.763 0.734 0.677 0.819 0.848 0.823 0.793 0.788 0.777
w2(t) 0.788 0.799 0.774 0.797 0.744 0.794 0.812 0.805 0.794 0.779 0.781
Three components of equation (1)
λnc(t)(1‐C(t‐1))w1(t) 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.019 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008
λcc(t)C(t‐1)w2(t) 0.696 0.709 0.680 0.705 0.660 0.720 0.723 0.709 0.696 0.682 0.674
λoc(t)μ(t) 0.188 0.178 0.199 0.185 0.236 0.184 0.163 0.170 0.182 0.190 0.188




2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Share with floor 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45
Frac. female with floor 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
Frac. female (all) 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Gap in fraction female ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.03
Mean education with floor 7.98 8.85 9.17 9.40 9.55 9.70 9.84 10.03 10.21
Mean education (all) 9.10 9.34 9.61 9.82 10.03 10.19 10.33 10.52 10.72
Gap in mean education ‐1.12 ‐0.49 ‐0.44 ‐0.42 ‐0.48 ‐0.49 ‐0.49 ‐0.50 ‐0.50
Mean age with floor 38.68 38.95 39.23 39.51 39.89 40.30 40.67 40.90 41.11
Mean age (all) 38.63 38.96 39.20 39.48 39.82 40.19 40.52 40.70 40.85
Gap in mean age 0.06 ‐0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.26
Mean tenure with floor 7.31 7.87 8.20 8.50 9.06 9.31 9.33 9.23 9.08
Mean tenure (all) 7.50 7.79 8.05 8.28 8.66 8.84 8.84 8.70 8.54
Gap in mean tenure ‐0.19 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.39 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.53
Mean log base wage with floor 6.58 6.68 6.70 6.68 6.66 6.66 6.67 6.67 6.68
Mean log base wage (all) 6.68 6.71 6.73 6.70 6.68 6.68 6.69 6.69 6.70
Gap in mean log base wage ‐0.10 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02
Mean log total wage with floor 6.73 6.84 6.87 6.85 6.84 6.84 6.85 6.84 6.85
Mean log total wage (all) 6.83 6.86 6.89 6.87 6.85 6.85 6.85 6.85 6.86
Gap in mean log total wage ‐0.09 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01
Notes: See notes to Table 2.
Appendix Table D1:  Models for 2010‐16 Change in Average Wage Floor ‐‐ Renegotiated CBA's
None 10th Pctile 25th Pctile 75th Pctile 90th Pctile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Without industry controls:
Change in Median Real Value Added/Worker 0.131 0.101 0.101 0.121 0.120
   (2009‐2015) (0.025) (0.028) (0.041) (0.034) (0.027)
Change in other Quantile of Real Value Added/Worker ‐‐ 0.038 0.035 0.012 0.019
   (2009‐2015) (0.021) (0.050) (0.022) (0.025)
R‐squared 0.510 0.534 0.523 0.513 0.526
With Controls for Industry:
Change in Real Value Added/Worker 0.094 0.066 0.064 0.099 0.087
   (2009‐2015) (0.036) (0.037) (0.044) (0.046) (0.037)
Change in other Quantile of Real Value Added/Worker ‐‐ 0.036 0.034 ‐0.008 0.015
   (2009‐2015) (0.024) (0.053) (0.030) (0.022)
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